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ORIGINAL PAPER
The Pyramid of Nonprofit Responsibility: The Institutionalization
of Organizational Responsibility Across Sectors
Shawn Pope1 • Patricia Bromley2 • Alwyn Lim3 • John W. Meyer4
 International Society for Third-Sector Research and The Johns Hopkins University 2018
Abstract Observers have noted that organizations in all
sectors, whether business, nonprofit, or government, have
been moving toward rationalized structures that presuppose
and express empowered organizational actorhood. We
draw upon neo-institutional theory in this paper to extend
the argument: The arrival of organizational actorhood has
precipitated a concomitant, cross-sectoral movement
toward organizational social responsibility. Whereas
existing research has tended to theorize the social respon-
sibilities of businesses, we develop a pyramid conceptual
schema to array the social responsibilities of nonprofits.
We then document the coevolution of organizational
actorhood and responsibility across both sectors with a
metastudy of nearly 200 extant surveys. We chart the
institutionalization of a slate of formal structures that
express organizational actorhood (i.e., mission statements,
vision statements, and strategic plans) and that profess and
define organizational social responsibilities (i.e., core val-
ues, ethics codes, and responsibility communications). We
close with implications and future directions for organi-
zational studies and research on corporate social
responsibility.
Keywords Nonprofit accountability  Nonprofit social
responsibility  Corporate social responsibility 
Organizational actorhood  Nonprofit ethics  Mission
statements
Introduction
Formal organizations are some of our most ubiquitous and
powerful social structures, having expanded rapidly in the
post-war period in type, number, resources, and global
reach (Bromley and Meyer 2015). With this inauguration
of our ‘‘organizational society’’ (Thompson 1980), the
constituent organizations have expanded, but also con-
verged in some dimensions (Bromley and Meyer 2017). It
is by now a classic observation, for example, that organi-
zations of all types, whether businesses, nonprofits, or
bureaucracies, have been moving toward the adoption of
rationalized practices and structures (Hwang and Powell
2009). Organizations today are to formalize and elaborate
their policies; measure, manage, and maximize their
resources; professionalize their ranks; and articulate their
various means–end relationships before an expanding array
of stakeholders (Hasselbladh and Kallinikos 2000). This is
increasingly true for Oxfam as much as the Ford Motor
Company.
We focus on a more recent trajectory of cross-sectoral
organizational convergence—toward the conceptualization
of organizations as ‘‘actors’’ (Hwang and Colyvas 2013;
King et al. 2010; King and Whetten 2008). Scholars have
noted with increasing frequency that organizations as dis-
parate as companies (Bromley and Sharkey 2017), uni-
versities (Krucken and Meier 2006), public agencies
(Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson 2000), cities (Nijman
2016), nations (Meyer et al. 1997), and international
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nongovernmental organizations (Boli and Thomas 1997)
are now understood to be actors. The boundedness,
sovereignty, and purposiveness of organizations and their
empowerment to make consequential decisions on many
fronts are inherent to the notion of organizational actor-
hood (Drori et al. 2009). The actorhood thesis proposes that
organizations are not merely contexts for action (Cyert and
March 2006) or instruments of owners’ interests (Friedman
1970), but are becoming constructed as freestanding,
highly strategic entities with their own rights and identities
(King and Whetten 2008).
In this paper, after setting out the organizational actor-
hood thesis as a main hypothesis, we seek to advance it in
two primary ways. First, we bring new metastudy data that
document the institutionalization of three formal structures
by which organizations can express their collective actor-
hood. With the adoption of these structures, organizations
can define (mission statements), dramatize (vision state-
ments), and implement (strategic plans) their actorhood.
Tracking the diffusion of these structures longitudinally,
we also examine them comparatively across companies and
nonprofits. The generally upward, converging trendlines
that we plot for the adoption rates of these formal docu-
ments within major populations of companies and non-
profits are based on nearly 200 surveys and six decades of
empirical research.
The second way that we develop the actorhood thesis is
by drawing out a corollary: The arrival of empowered
organizational actorhood has precipitated a concomitant,
cross-sectoral movement toward organizational social
responsibility. We provide support for this follow-on
argument by documenting the co-institutionalization across
both nonprofits and companies of formal structures that
define and express organizational responsibility. Among
these are structures by which organizations can commit
themselves to moralistic principles (statements of core
values), define in rule-like terms their own extra-legal
social obligations (codes of ethics), report to outsiders their
good deeds (responsibility reports), and engage with
counterparts in the wider responsibility field (multi-stake-
holder platforms). The increasingly indiscriminate migra-
tion of these structures across sectors suggests that social
responsibility is becoming an integral and perhaps taken-
for-granted feature of the contemporary organization. By
paying attention to the spread of the explicit language,
structures, and practices of this social responsibility
movement beyond its traditional home in the private sector,
analysts can gain a better understanding of the nature of
this movement—which has long held out promise for
improving social welfare.
In the process of pursuing the two main lines of argu-
ment above, we make two secondary contributions. First, to
ground a literature on nonprofit social responsibility that is
still underdeveloped in comparison with the massive
research on corporate social responsibility, we debut a
pyramid schema that conceptually arrays the major evo-
lutions of the nonprofit responsibility movement in recent
decades. Second, in closing our paper, we discuss an
emergent finding: while nonprofits and companies are
converging upon a slate of formal actorhood and respon-
sibility structures—they have done so from different
directions. Some of our featured structures have prove-
nance in the for-profit sector, whereas others have migrated
from the third sector. As such, our data and findings add
specificity to the historical record on the ‘‘blurring of the
organizational boundaries’’ that separate sectors (Bromley
and Meyer 2017) and on the emergence of ‘‘hybrid’’
organizations that blend logics from corporations, non-
profits, and public agencies (Smith, 2014).
Theoretical Background: The Neo-Institutional
Roots of the Cross-Sectoral Rationalization
and Standardization of Organizations
While organizations might be envisioned as self-contained
units or occupants of well-demarcated industries, sectors,
or nations, neo-institutional theory points out that they are
also constituents of a wider, largely shared, and much more
amorphous cultural domain (Greenwood et al. 2017; Meyer
and Rowan 1977). In this broader environment, the cultural
forces are diffuse, increasingly global, and thoroughly
penetrative across and within organizations. Formal orga-
nizational structures, then, are oftentimes outward-facing
displays of cultural solidarity (Meyer and Rowan 1977),
which organizations might even decouple from internal
practices to preserve autonomy and efficiency (Bromley
and Powell 2012).
Neo-institutional scholars have long focused on identi-
fying the content and effects upon organizations of the
cultural forces at play. A traditional focus of this research
has been the massive cultural trend toward rationalization
(Hasselbladh and Kallinikos 2000). Rationalization, in this
usage, suggests the theorization of the logically consistent
and causal interconnections among social categories and
entities, oftentimes in the grammar of means and ends
(Strang and Meyer 1993). A second cultural trend well
noted by neo-institutionalists is scientization (Drori et al.
2003, 2006). Here, rationality becomes directed, as theo-
rists build and test hypotheses about relationships between
social entities to produce innovations and increase the
stock of verified knowledge. A central insight across this
body of work is that these cultural modes of thinking are
reproduced through massively expanded educational sys-
tems (Meyer et al. 1992; Schofer and Meyer 2005).
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Rationalization and scientization have had sweeping
effects upon organizations. Organizations of all types are
now conditioned by these social trends to formalize and
elaborate their structures, and to articulate the contributions
of their structures to explicitly defined organizational goals
(Bromley and Meyer 2015). Organizations are expected to
implement rationalized structures in ways that produce
control, accountability, and reproducibility (Murtaza 2012;
Young et al. 1999). This has occurred across sectors.
Businesses, of course, have been strongly affected, as their
goals have been constructed as more singularly focused on
profits, allowing for tighter prescriptions for success
(Meyer and Ho¨llerer 2010). Bureaucracies, as well, the
original objects of rationalization for Weber (1922), have
continued to undergo the process, especially in the 1980s
with the arrival of ‘‘new public management’’ (Hood
1995). Nonprofits, finally, have faced similar pressures to
formalize their structures, professionalize their ranks,
specify their goals, and measure and manage their resour-
ces (Arvidson and Lyon 2014; Hwang and Powell 2009).
As a result, clearly the observation continues to ring true
that ‘‘Industrial societies are increasingly dominated in all
spheres by large, complex organizations, staffed by full-
time, expert officials, acting in accordance with detailed
rules’’ (Thompson 1980: 3).
These sweeping cultural movements toward rationality
and scientization have contributed to the increasing insti-
tutionalization of a standardized social unit called ‘‘orga-
nization.’’ Mimetic isomorphism has resulted as
professionalized managers, individually, have sought out
‘‘best practices’’ which have been endorsed by epistemic
communities, permit comprehensibility across disparate
audiences, and signal to donors, investors, and other
audiences a continued commitment to progress. The
organizational structures that emerge and solidify to solve
these legitimacy problems oftentimes spread quickly
throughout organizational populations, as demonstrated by
research on management ‘‘fads and fashions’’ (Abraham-
son and Fairchild 1999). This research has showcased
management trends that tend to be very generic, and thus
able to spread indiscriminately across businesses, govern-
ment, or nonprofits. The ‘‘balanced scorecard,’’ for exam-
ple, can be used to optimize strategy implementation by a
corporation, but also by a university or city council.
‘‘Sensitivity training’’ can be implemented by philanthropy
in the same manner as an international nongovernmental
organization. An investment bank or a military brigade can
institute ‘‘360 Performance Reviews.’’ Research finds that
these management fashions are spreading farther, faster,
with greater intensity, and sometimes deinstitutionalizing
with the same celerity (Carson et al. 2000). The overall
process suggests a population of standardized organiza-
tions, staffed by managers facing similar legitimacy
problems who, in the process of seeking solutions, drive
their organizations toward greater isomorphism.
Hypotheses
Actorhood as Organizational Script
Instilled with the trait of efficiency-seeking rationality and
increasingly standardized as a social unit, the modern
organization is now viewed also as an ‘‘actor.’’ Discourses
of actorhood, now ubiquitous at many levels of social
organization, have the deepest cultural roots at the level of
the individual (Meyer 2010). Internationally over recent
centuries, a human rights movement has been largely
successful in incorporating many types of humans into the
category of the modern individual, including racial
minorities, women, children, and homosexuals (Beck et al.
2012), and investing these individuals with an expanding
array of inalienable human rights—voting, reproduction,
free speech, rights of assembly. Reflecting these changes,
the social science textbooks that young students read
worldwide now sanctify and valorize personhood (Bromley
et al. 2011), even as they celebrate human diversity
(Ramirez et al. 2009). At the societal level, our most
legitimate systems are now premised on the sacrosanct
individual, whether it is democratic governance, capitalist
enterprise, or secular, humanistic culture.
For organizational actorhood, individual actorhood
represents not just a parallel discourse, but in some senses
serves as the model. The individual is currently the
example by which many of the rights of organizations are
understood, at least in the judicial context of the USA, the
country with the most nonprofits and multinationals firms
(Gabel and Bruner 2003). Since the late nineteenth century,
the American legal doctrine of corporate personhood has
conferred on organizations many rights initially intended
for natural persons, including private property, due process,
free speech, and the right to enter contracts and be sued for
breaches (Winkler 2018). Indeed, according to Title 1 of
the United States Code, where ‘‘person’’ appears in federal
statutes, unless otherwise specified, it refers to a natural
person or to ‘‘corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well
as individuals.’’ This conflation of natural persons and
organizations, of course, is controversial: Corporations
might corrupt democracy if enabled to spend massive
resources on government lobbying.
Whether figment of law or threat to democracy, the
actorhood conception of organizations has public currency.
It is now generally accepted that organizations are to have
identity, sovereignty, and capacities for voice and strategic
action (Bromley and Sharkey 2017; King et al. 2010;
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Whetten and Mackey 2002). Marking their social con-
struction as actors, organizations now increasingly seek to
coalesce their disparate purposes and departments into
simplified, anthropomorphic identities, with organization-
level rather than product-level branding now a common-
place activity not only among corporations, but also among
charities (Stride 2006), universities (Drori et al. 2013),
cities (Kavaratzis 2004), and nations (Fan 2006). This
actorhood conception of organizations contrasts with other
perspectives. It diverges from transaction-cost views that
construe organizations as a ‘‘nexus of contracts’’—bundles
of rights and obligations to shareholders, employees, and
clients, rather than as self-contained units (Jensen and
Meckling 1976). It differs from studies on ‘‘the varieties of
capitalism’’ that view organizations as embodiments of
national cultures rather than as structures that are increas-
ingly standardized across contexts and free to move across
them. It also departs from discourses within finance and
law that frame organizations as instruments—servants of
the goals of their shareholders—rather than independent
entities with their own rights and purposes (Friedman
1970). Compared with these perspectives, the actorhood
conception highlights the bounded, purposive, and strategic
nature of the modern organization.
Institutionalized Structures of Organizational
Actorhood
In this section, after introducing three organizational doc-
uments by which organizations can specify and dramatize
their actorhood, we motivate hypotheses about the spread
of these structures cross-sectorally. These documents
prompt organizations to set the parameters of their actor-
hood: What is the actor is seeking (mission statements),
what will result from goal accomplishment (vision state-
ments); and how, exactly, will the actor set about things
(strategic plans).1
Mission statements, generally consisting of a sentence or
two and displayed in formal documents and on Web sites,
articulate an organization’s purpose in abstract, aspirational
terms (e.g., Patagonia aims to ‘‘Build the best product,
cause no unnecessary harm, and use business to inspire and
implement solutions to the environmental crisis’’). Vision
statements, also generally a sentence or two, describe the
positive social impacts rendered by mission accomplish-
ment (e.g., Amazon strives ‘‘to be earth’s most customer-
centric company, to build a place where people can come
to find and discover anything they might want to buy
online’’). Lastly, strategic plans, often ten or more pages,
break mission and vision into smaller goals, discussing
intermediate steps and processes to be pursued over a
horizon of several years.
These formal actorhood documents might be dismissed
as mere gloss and lofty self-representations intended for
public cheerleading. The documents, however, are as much
process as product, as their adoption is meant to be an
occasion for organizational soul searching about the big
questions of who we are and what we want. Mission
statements, for example, oftentimes take months to pro-
duce, involving iterative discussions among executives,
board members, and workers, and agonizing debates over
the precise language. Strategic plans may evolve from
many drafts and refinements, with intensive auditing to
assess what is feasible with existing resources and in the
prevailing regulatory and competitive contexts. Consul-
tants may be involved to spark ideas and provide objec-
tivity. These documents, in sum, reflect a wider cultural
environment in which organizations are increasingly driven
to articulate their purposes, consequences, and plans, and
thereby to dramatize their actorhood. As reviewed above,
given the deep cultural roots in wider society of the
actorhood discourses that surround these formal organiza-
tional documents, we expect the documents to have
undergone a diffusion in recent decades that cross-cuts
organizational sectors, particularly nonprofits and
companies.
Hypothesis 1 There has been an upward trend in adop-
tion rates for both nonprofits and businesses of structures
that express organizational actorhood.
The Dialectic of Actorhood and Social Responsibility
Autonomous actorhood is a potential threat to community
solidarity and thus tends to generate a dialectical move-
ment toward social responsibility. In this section, we dis-
cuss this dialectic for the modern individual, draw the
parallel for companies, and introduce the organizational
structures that have emerged from the dialectic. We then
draw the parallel for nonprofits, in the process introducing
an analytic scheme laying out the major developments of
nonprofit responsibility in recent decades.
In the Western cultural tradition, the pulling out of the
individual from tribe and place, the standardization of the
individual across race and gender, and the vesting of the
individual with social mobility, self-interestedness, and
expanded decision-making has come with an attendant
1 These objects are not exhaustive of the structures by which
organizations can institute the idea of actorhood, but are perhaps the
ones most directly related to actorhood in their basic purposes. We
have selected them (and analogous ones for organizational respon-
sibility) also for practical reasons—they are the most well studied. A
large survey literature on these structures permits our metastudy
methodology that compiles time-point estimates across years of the
prevalence of these documents for comparable samples of companies
and nonprofits.
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emphasis on individual social responsibility. In classical
antiquity, for example, while ‘‘the freedom to do and think
as you please…was the very lifeblood of the Greeks’’
(James 1956: 2), the same Hellenic society developed the
forerunner to modern conceptions of citizenship and civic
responsibility (Liddel 2007). The Age of Enlightenment
saw a rebirth of discourses on individual liberty, but also a
concomitant interest in political philosophies that subor-
dinated individual freedoms to the needs of wider society
(e.g., the ‘‘social contract’’ of John Locke and the ‘‘le-
viathan’’ of Thomas Hobbes). In the 1800s, humanistic and
political philosophies converged in discourses about ‘‘civil
society,’’ in which a neoliberal community of freestanding
associations was thought to be able to generate a profusion
of civic norms and social responsibilities (see Alexis de
Toqueville’s ‘‘Democracy in America’’). More generally,
from a comparative perspective, individualistic Western
cultures are thought to be characterized by a more explicit
articulation and lavish display of individual social
responsibilities (Matten and Moon 2008).
A similar movement toward social responsibility has
occurred for organizations as they have become empow-
ered actors. This countermovement has been especially
explicit and forceful for business corporations. As multi-
nationals rapidly increased in number, size, and global
reach in the post-war period (Pope and Meyer 2015), they
were accused of destabilizing host societies and of trucking
away the resources of local communities (Wallerstein
1979). Where corporate-mediated, free-market capitalism
was installed in non-Western countries in the mid-twenti-
eth century through government directive, political econ-
omists noted ‘‘double movements’’ to re-assert community
protections (Polanyi 1944). By the 1970s, the problem of
multinational corporations operating outside the bounds of
home-country regulation had generated policy responses
from the world polity in the form of social responsibility
initiatives from the United Nations (UN), the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the
International Labor Organization. Dissension continued
throughout the 1990s with suspicions that multinationals
corporations were exploiting foreign sources of cheap labor
(Bartley 2007), relocating to ‘‘tax havens’’ (Desai et al.
2006), or ‘‘racing to the bottom’’ by offshoring production
to countries with lax environmental regulation (He 2006).
During this period, activists and nonprofit groups helped
compel responsibility frameworks in industries such as
apparel, timber, minerals, banking, and fishing. By the
2000s, corporations themselves were establishing hundreds
of business-membered CSR coalitions at the country and
industry levels to manage the external pressures (Grayson
and Nelson 2013). Today, the social responsibility
movement has become somewhat of a consensus move-
ment, with many chief executives of major multinational
corporations agreeing in public forums, oftentimes enthu-
siastically, that their increased standing in society comes
with greater responsibility.
The Evolving Substance of Nonprofit Responsibility
The corporate social responsibility (‘‘CSR’’) movement
should more accurately be called the organizational
responsibility (‘‘OSR’’) movement. Broad cultural forces
are currently leading all organizations, including nonprof-
its, whose positive impacts on society have long been
nearly taken for granted, to discuss their social impacts in
the explicit language of social responsibility (Lin-Hi et al.
2015). In this section, we drill down into the specifics of
nonprofit responsibilities, arraying six dimensions in a
pyramid structure.
Inspiring our conceptual schema is one of the most-cited
articles on the subject of business responsibility, Carroll’s
(1991) ‘‘The Pyramid of CSR.’’ Carroll’s pyramid analyt-
ically distinguished four major dimensions of CSR, which
(in ascending order) are economic, legal, ethical, and phi-
lanthropic responsibilities. Unfortunately, Carroll’s pyra-
mid has little import to nonprofits. The base-level
responsibility of profitability is definitionally not a non-
profit responsibility. Philanthropic responsibilities, at the
pinnacle of the CSR pyramid, are fundamental to non-
profits, not their highest aspiration. The pyramid, finally,
elides responsibility discourses that have been especially
intense for nonprofits, notably accountability (Costa et al.
2011). Whereas capital markets and the structure of the
Berle-Means corporation are designed specifically to
compel business accountability, nonprofits have tradition-
ally had more distant, less controlling relationships with
their donors. Unable to transpose Carroll’s influential
pyramid to the nonprofit sector, we offer our own Pyramid
of Nonprofit Responsibilities in Fig. 1 in the same spirit of
Carroll (1991) and with the same purpose of promoting
future scholarship. We present our pyramid as both an
analytic schema and a timeline that captures major devel-
opments over recent decades.
Mission, at the base of our pyramid, is a nonprofit
responsibility in the same manner that Carroll (1991)
describes generating profits as the most basic social
responsibility of companies. It suggests that nonprofits
should seek to honor their social calling—to deliver public
goods underinvested in by the government and for-profit
sectors. In contrast with companies, of course, nonprofits
generally seek these public goods intentionally through
their core operations.
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The next level, lawfulness,2 suggests that nonprofits
have a basic social responsibility not only to address
themselves to worthy causes, but also to pursue them in
accordance with applicable laws and regulations. This
particular nonprofit responsibility has been elaborated over
time. For example, an early legal requirement for non-
profits in the USA was to submit a ‘‘Form 990’’ to disclose
the names of donors who had given more than $4000 to the
organization in a given year. Reflecting the increased
legalization of nonprofits, this form grew in length from 2
pages in 1941, to 4 pages in 1947, to 5 pages in 1976, and
to 6 pages in 2000 (while the form’s instructions grew to 42
pages). There are now 16 different schedules of this form,
addressed to specific types of nonprofits (e.g., schools and
hospitals) and specific activities (e.g., lobbying and non-
cash contributions). As another example of discourses
about nonprofit legality, some nonprofits have been chal-
lenged as having a questionable need for tax-exempt status,
such as the United States National Football League (which
in 2015 dropped the tax-exempt status it had held since
1942), or dubious social welfare impacts, such as Political
Action Committees.
Moving up the pyramid, a dimension of nonprofit
responsibility that came to be heavily theorized in the
1980s was accountability (Campbell 2002; Gugerty and
Prakash 2010; Ebrahim 2003, 2010; Saxton and Guo 2011).
Accountability suggested that having an impactful mission
and lawful operations is insufficient to legitimate the
nonprofit if the goals are pursued unilaterally, opaquely, or
incompetently (Bovens 2007; Hood 1995). Accountability
has become a more encompassing concept in recent years
(Williams and Taylor 2013). Ebrahim (2010: 102) high-
lighted three areas of this expansion—in the objects of
accountability (previously internal, but now also external
stakeholders); the subjects of accountability (previously
mission-related, now including many broader community
concerns); and the mechanisms of accountability (now
much more formalized). Astonished by this sweeping
expansion, Ebrahim asked: ‘‘Is it feasible, or even desir-
able, for nonprofits to be accountable to everyone for
everything?’’
Accountability as a dimension of nonprofit responsibil-
ity can feed back into lawfulness (Gibelman and Gelman
2004). In 2006, for example, US legal regulations expan-
ded with Public Inspection IRC 6104(d), instituting the
requirement that nonprofits produce to any requester the
three most recent years of their 990 Forms. Additionally,
after a raft of scandals in the 2000s implicating major US
nonprofits—notably the Red Cross, the United Way, and
the Nature Conservancy—politicians and activists began to
make calls for such reforms as requiring the auditing of
nonprofit financial statements as well as the restructuring of
Cutting-edge or highly original 
social programs of all types
Federations, forums, alliances,
councils, multi-stakeholder & 
epistemic communities
Codes of conduct; Statements 
of principles, values, and 
beliefs 
Rating agencies; auditing 
schemes; accounting rules, 
accreditation
Credentialing & training, oversight 
boards, best practice standards, 
benchmarking, strategic planning
Charitable work of all types
Description & Examples
Discretionary, individualistic, or 
innovative acts of social 
responsibility 
Non-profits as constructive 
participants of a very wide, cross-
sectoral organizational field
Voluntary endorsement of 
widely held social norms and 
proto-legal discourses
Financial and operational 
transparency with donors and 
communities 
Non-profit as ongoing, 
professional, rationalized, well 
managed institution
Commitment to the cause 
2000s – today 
2005 – today 
1800s – today
1980s – today 
Mid-1990s – today 
1990s – today 
CITIZENSHIP
ETHICS
LEADERSHIP
ACCOUNTABILITY
Internal
MISSION
Level & DictumPeriod
LAWFULNESS1940s – today
External
Adherence to applicable 
laws and regulations
Fraud prevention; Tax 
avoidance; Political lobbying; 
Board elections
Make a positive social
impact. 
Follow the law.
Be efficient.
Be transparent.
Respect community 
norms.
Advance the collective 
movement.
Model innovative 
practices.
Fig. 1 Pyramid of nonprofit responsibilities
2 We have carried over lawfulness, ethics, and citizenship from
Carroll’s pyramid and have arrived these dimension relative to one
another in the same ascending order.
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nonprofit boards to include independent audit committees
(see Mead 2008 for an analysis).
More recently, nonprofit responsibility has come to
encompass ethics—the avoidance of behaviors that, while
not strictly illegal, are inappropriate, unfair, or exploitative.
A focus on ethics in some organizations is very old (con-
sider the vows of chastity and poverty in medieval
monasteries; Guijarro 2013), but the spread of explicit
ethical frameworks across organizations in very disparate
sectors began in earnest only in the 1990s. Bromley and
Orchard (2015), in their analysis of the diffusion of codes
of conduct among American state-level nonprofits
(n = 45), found that adopters increased from 0 around
1990, to 5 in the year 2000, to more than 25 in the year
2011. These codes often address such things as how to
handle whistleblowers or to regulate gifts from clients.
More generally, the codes may be considered as extensions
of lawfulness, but taking with a broader view of the rele-
vant rules and norms that should condition nonprofit
behavior (Sidel 2005; Weidenbaum 2009).
Two more recent movements in the transformation of
nonprofits into responsible actors are now coming into
view. First, citizenship stresses the membership obligations
of nonprofits within communities and host nations. As
morally empowered societal representatives, nonprofits
might enact their citizenship by working collaboratively
with other organizations in pursuit of positive social
change at the field level. Many international social
responsibility initiatives now have a citizenship focus by
operating primarily through the model of the multi-stake-
holder platform, prominently including the United Nations
Global Compact. The horizontal forms of engagement that
characterize such initiatives have served to recast them as
‘‘learning networks’’ through which organizations share
knowledge and create best practices (Ruggie 2001). While
almost all scholarly attention to these multi-stakeholder
initiatives has focused on the experience of companies, it is
important to note that nonprofits can produce responsibility
reports through the Global Reporting Initiative, manage
their environmental waste through the ISO 14001 stan-
dards, certify the eco-efficiency of their office buildings
through the LEED program, or contribute to public agenda
setting through the World Economic Forum.
The final development in the transformation of non-
profits into organizational actors is leadership. Here, rather
than stakeholders such as target communities (mission),
regulators (lawfulness), donors, employees, and rating
agencies (accountability), or even peer organizations and
business counterparts (citizenship), the nonprofit itself
becomes the focus. The nonprofit strives at this level to
develop its own unique interpretation of its social respon-
sibilities. Leadership manifests in discretionary, moralistic
responsibilities in pursuit of causes that may be tangential
to core organizational goals. An example is the path-
breaking efforts of the Sovereign Wealth Fund of Norway
to position itself as a socially responsible investment fund
by divesting from companies complicit in human rights
abuses or contributing unduly to global warming. Another
recent example are the magnanimous efforts of such high-
status US universities as MIT and Stanford to create
massive open online courses so that world-class instruction
can be available to anyone with an internet connection. In
these examples, the nonprofits are vanguards for the cre-
ation, legitimation, and diffusion of social practices within
their respective fields.
The Institutionalization of Structures of Social
Responsibility
There are now many open-ended structures of social
responsibility that afford organizations much discretion in
formulating and publicizing their interpretations of their
mission, lawfulness, ethicality, accountability, citizenship,
and leadership. Some of these structures enable organiza-
tions to declare the moralistic constraints on their actor-
hood (statements of core values); avow the extra-legal
norms of the community (codes of ethics); and continually
update the community on their social impacts (CSR
reports).
Statements of core values, usually a series of 4–6 bullet
points and descriptions, describe in essentialist terms the
qualities of the organization’s personhood. Based on our
review of hundreds of these values statements, they tend to
feature both human-like qualities (e.g., integrity, account-
ability, passion) and business-like qualities (e.g., excel-
lence, reliability, or innovation). Codes of ethics (usually
exceeding 10 pages in length) describe in rule-like terms
the procedures for dealing with ethical dilemmas in an
organization, and generally hold to a higher behavioral
standard than is required by law. CSR reports publicize the
activities organizations are doing to advance social and
environmental causes. They vary in length from one to
hundreds of pages, appear often in dedicated sections of
the organizations’ homepage, and frequently use stan-
dardized reporting protocols such as those of the Global
Reporting Initiative or Carbon Disclosure Project.
These responsibility structures are becoming more
established and standardized at the field-level and inter-
nationally. For codes of conduct, reflecting an increased
institutionalization of a highly generalizable definition of
what it means to be an ethical organizational actor, a
nonprofit in any industry and any nation can now become
an official supporter of the 44-page Code of Ethics and
Conduct for NGOs of the World Association of Non-gov-
ernmental Organizations. Panel A of Fig. 2 shows that the
supporters of this code have grown to 3500 since its launch
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in 2005, represent 160 countries, and include nonprofits as
disparate as the American ‘‘Global Fair Banking Initiative’’
and the Cameroonian ‘‘Association for the Protection of
Women’s and Children’s Rights.’’ For statements of core
values, forerunners such as the Johnson Credo (1943) and
Sullivan Principles (1977) have spawned more interna-
tional, cross-sectoral principles and value-based frame-
works, such as the Global Compact, whose ten core
principles have been endorsed by more than 4000 busi-
nesses in nearly all countries worldwide. On this score,
Panel B of Fig. 2 shows that nonprofits have become an
increasingly high share of signatories to the Global Com-
pact over time. For CSR reporting, finally, there is a now a
global, multi-sectoral framework, the Global Reporting
Initiative, that allows companies to use a standardized
reporting format to disclose their CSR activities in areas
ranging from working conditions to pollution emissions.
Similar to the Global Compact, the Global Reporting Ini-
tiative has opened to nonprofits, who now constitute about
5% of participants (see Panel C of Fig. 2).
While codes of ethics, statements of core values, and
responsibility reporting frameworks may constrain orga-
nizational actorhood, they also presuppose, reinforce, and
legitimate it. The open-ended format of codes of conduct,
for example, affords organizations much latitude to
develop unique, individualistic, and highly discretionary
interpretations of their ethical obligations. Core values
statements similarly give organizations much creative
license to define the nature of their own actorhood. Like-
wise, the annual reports by which organizations publicize
their social responsibility programs, policies, and social
impacts tend to be highly charismatic affairs, prefaced with
personal statements from CEOs and studded throughout
with appealing anecdotes, images, and charts. Partly
because these structures of social responsibility legitimate
organizational actorhood, even as they claim to enlighten
and discipline it, we hypothesize that they have been able
to travel together across organizational sectors with the
actorhood structures that were hypothesized earlier to be
proliferating among nonprofits and companies.
Hypothesis 2 There has been an upward trend in adop-
tion rates for both nonprofits and businesses of structures
that express organizational responsibility.
Methods
A Metastudy of the Institutionalization Across
Sectors of Actorhood and Responsibility Structures
Our methodological approach for testing whether actor-
hood and responsibility structures are increasing in adop-
tion across both nonprofits and companies was a
metastudy. The underlying sample for the metastudy were
all previous empirical studies that we could locate in major
scholarly databases and through leading search engines that
reported a time-point incidence of a particular structure
within a sample of corporations or nonprofits. We arrayed
the estimates of the incidence rates from these studies in a
scatterplot format to yield a longitudinal view of the
institutionalization of actorhood and responsibility struc-
tures, whereas previous individual studies of these struc-
tures have been almost entirely cross-sectional and sector-
specific. More generally, due to a larger sample size than
what is generally feasible in a single research effort, a
metastudy has the advantage of greater coverage and
generalizability, as well as greater resistance to idiosyn-
cratic errors that may contaminate underlying studies
(Glass et al. 1981).
We used the building blocks search tactic (Booth 2008)
to gather from leading scholarly databases (Google
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Scholar; Web of Science) and internet search engines
(Google; Bing) the sample that underpins our metastudy.
That is, we used Boolean operators and wildcard operators
to enter into search fields a combination of synonymous
key words for the structure in question (e.g., ‘‘core values,’’
‘‘values statement’’) and for the methods that might yield a
research piece that reports an incidence rate (‘‘survey,’’
‘‘prevalence,’’ ‘‘respondent,’’ etc.). We then expanded the
initial search results through citation pearl growing,
whereby we perused the citation trees of qualifying studies
for additional positive matches. Another search tactic was
to search for and read through articles whose primary
purpose was to recount the history of a particular actorhood
or responsibility document, a useful strategy as these his-
torical pieces oftentimes reported secondary data on the
incident rates from other studies, which could themselves
be retrieved online. In a handful of cases, we also found
literature reviews that displayed tables with all previous
studies of an actorhood or responsibility structure, pro-
viding another source of potential qualifying studies to read
through (e.g., see Rhyne 1986 for table listing previous
research on strategic plans).
To enable meaningful across-time comparisons of inci-
dent rates, we restricted the sample studies to those that
surveyed similar populations. For companies, we included
only studies of very large companies such as the Fortune
500 or the Businessweek 1000. For nonprofits, where the
overall research has been less focused on samples of large
or international organizations, we included studies only if
they reported an incidence rate among a national sample or
a sub-national sample of nonprofits of many types. This is
to say that we excluded, for example, a survey of the
adoption rates of a vision statement within churches in Salt
Lake City, but would include a similar survey if the sample
of churches was national in scope or if the survey was
conducted in Salt Lake City, but of not only churches, but
also schools, hospitals, and foundations. These differing
base populations were necessary to ensure a reasonably
large and comparable sample size within both companies
and nonprofits, and should be kept in mind when inter-
preting our results.
We note that there were many differences in method-
ology within the sample studies. Some studies assigned a
company as having an actorhood or responsibility structure
if it was self-reported by a survey respondent, whereas
others coded it as present if the structure was referenced on
the company homepage or in an annual report. Our
reported charts include all estimates of the incidences of
the structures, regardless of methodology, to give an
impression of the overall research attention to each struc-
ture. Our results do not meaningfully change if the analysis
is restricted to studies using similar methodologies. The
final sample for all actorhood and responsibility structures
and for both nonprofits and companies included 196
underlying studies. We note that, while the large share of
our sample has been published by academics (72%), there
is also a strong representation from practitioner groups
such as foundations, consultants, and associations (28%).
The mean publication year across all studies is 2004, and
when excluding codes of ethics and strategic plans is 2007,
overall suggesting that research into structures of organi-
zational actorhood and responsibility has tended to occur
within the last two decades.
From each qualifying study, we gleaned the estimate of
the incidences of actorhood and responsibility structures.
We then entered these estimates into a scatterplot where
the y-axis is incidence rate and the x-axis is the survey year
of the underlying study. In cases where authors did not
provide the year the survey was conducted, we assumed
that it was the year prior to the publication of the research
article or report. Our scatterplot assigns grey dots to
company estimates and black dots to nonprofits. As a
robustness check to ensure that the estimates in the scat-
terplots are clustered primarily by time, suggesting that
nonprofits and businesses are responding to larger social
trends rather than undergoing their own individualistic
trajectories, we submitted the results to K-means clustering
using two groups. Similarly, we ensured that our inter-
pretation of the findings did not change if we fitted expo-
nential rather than linear trend lines. Our scatterplots show
R2 statistics to give some indication of the strength of the
linear relationships.
Our secondary methodological approach was a cross-
sectional content analysis performed in the first few months
of 2017 of the Web sites of Fortune 100 companies (the
largest 100 US companies by revenues) and Forbes 100
charitable organizations (the largest 100 US charities and
nonprofits by value of private donations received). We
added this secondary study because we wanted to examine
the incidence rates for all the actorhood and responsibility
structures in a single study when using standardized coding
protocols, rather than observing time-point estimates across
scores of studies that individually have their own
methodologies. We obtained the URLs of main organiza-
tional homepages from Compustat or the Guidestar data-
bases, and perused the homepages to code the presence or
absence of the actorhood and responsibility structures
according to the guidelines below.
We coded vision and mission (sometimes called ‘‘pur-
pose’’) as present if the respective structures could be
identified in unmistakable terms on the organizational Web
site, for example, in the main headers of the homepage, on
the site map, or in the ‘‘about us’’ section. For companies,
we coded CSR communications as present if there was a
dedicated Web site header for such things as social
responsibility, the community, or sustainability. Nonprofits
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qualified by having a responsibility statement, a dedicated
area for ‘‘accountability,’’ or an advertisement of their
ratings or accreditations by such organizations as the Better
Business Bureau or Charity Navigator. Core values were
coded as present if they were clearly headlined by such
headers or links as ‘‘our values,’’ ‘‘our principles,’’ or ‘‘our
beliefs,’’ or whether they were listed in the introductory
section of the code of ethics (sometimes called the ‘‘code of
conduct’’).3
We make a special note in regard to strategic plans. Our
content analysis revealed that nonprofits frequently publish
documents on their Web sites that included titles with
synonymous language for ‘‘strategic plan,’’ whereas this
was a rarity for companies. We suspect that nonprofits
display strategic plans to legitimate themselves as effi-
ciency-oriented actors, whereas companies, though gener-
ally having a strategic plan, are much less likely to divulge
its nuts and bolts to the public in order to conceal their
competitive intentions. Given that our meta-analysis sug-
gests a very high rate of strategic planning among corpo-
rations, we did not code the presence of a strategic
planning document in our content analyses to avoid mis-
leading or inaccurate results. Results of the content analysis
are in Fig. 4, and the relevant time-point estimates from the
analysis have been added to the respective scatterplots of
Fig. 3. At the bottom of Fig. 4 are statistics that tests for
meaningful differences in incidence rates across companies
and nonprofits at a significance threshold of p\ 0.05
(Fig. 3).
Results
H1 proposed that the formal structures that function pri-
marily to express organizational actorhood are increasingly
adopted among both nonprofits and companies. The results
are largely supportive. The trendlines for the adoption of
mission statements, visions statements, and strategic plans
are upward for both organizational types, with the excep-
tion of mission statements for nonprofits, where the adop-
tion rates had leveled out at about 90% by the mid-2000s
(with no studies locatable that reported an incidence rate
before that period). The trendlines for each document have
also converged in recent years or appear to be converging
in the near future, suggesting the constitutive standardiza-
tion of organizations across sectors that we discussed in our
theory section. We note also that, by now, each of the
actorhood structures is highly prevalent among both
nonprofits and companies, with the charts suggesting an
average incidence rate of about 80%. That said, our own
original content analysis of organization webpages (see
Fig. 4) suggests that organizations much less frequently
display many of these documents in prominent places of
their Web sites. We note, further, that the research on
actorhood documents is much older for companies than for
nonprofits. The starkest example of this lag in research
interest is for strategic plans, where some company surveys
date back to the 1960s but where nonprofit research began
only in the mid-1990s.
H2 proposed that both nonprofits and companies are
increasingly adopting formal structures that function, in
large part, to express organizational responsibility. Evi-
dence for this hypothesis is also generally positive: The
scatterplots display upward, converging trendlines for the
adoption of statements of core values, CSR communica-
tions, and codes of ethics. As with the actorhood docu-
ments, survey research on the responsibility structures
appeared earlier and has been more intensive for compa-
nies than nonprofits. That said, the responsibility docu-
ments, by now, have obtained high levels of adoption
(* 80%) among both nonprofits and companies. For
example, whereas an estimated 60% of companies had
CSR communications in the early 1990s, an estimated 90%
of companies have them today.
We close the results section by discussing the findings of
our own original Web site content analysis. This more
standardized, but cross-sectional analysis yields statisti-
cally significant differences in the formalization of actor-
hood and responsibility across nonprofits and companies.
For instance, whereas 91% of large nonprofits displayed a
Web site mission statement, only 72% of companies did so.
For vision statements, the analogous figures were 52% and
36%. Here and elsewhere, these differences in means are
statistically significant at the 5% threshold. These findings
suggest that the identities of contemporary nonprofits are
still tightly constructed around noble causes (missions) and
the desire to effect positive changes in a social sphere
(vision). Companies, by contrast, appear somewhat less
likely to articulate and publicize a mission or vision, per-
haps because their profitability intentions are taken for
granted.
The opposite pattern is apparent for the responsibility
documents: Companies have a statistically higher likeli-
hood of displaying a statement of core values (77% versus
43%), a section devoted to explicit CSR communications
(92% versus 58%), or a code of ethics (97% versus 37%).
This divergence is perhaps because the generally prosocial
orientation of nonprofits is assumed by observers whereas
companies must devote considerable attention to CSR to
assuage concerns that their self-interested profit motiva-
tions are socially deleterious. Overall, however, the Web
3 We note that public companies in America have been required since
2003 by the Securities and Exchange Commission to have a code of
conduct or to explain why one is not necessary, but are not required to
publish their codes of conduct on their websites.
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site content analysis reinforces the metastudy by finding a
similar ordering of adoption rates for the respective docu-
ments as has been found historically, e.g., for some time,
nonprofits appear to have had slightly higher adoptions of
mission and vision statements. However, the Web site
analysis also serves to place limits on the interpretation of
the metastudy, showing that the convergence toward
actorhood and responsibility is far from complete, with
substantial differences remaining in the incidences of the
six formal structures across sectors.
Discussion and Conclusion
In recent decades, social arenas of all sorts have increas-
ingly become structured into fields of formal, rationalized
organizations. For nonprofits, previously incommensurate
forms such as charities and churches, schools and cities,
hospitals and sports clubs now adopt similar structures—
becoming autonomous, responsible decision-makers. This
transformation has increased in scholarly and practical
significance as nonprofits have grown in number at
domestic and global levels, commanded greater resources,
and addressed themselves to a wider array of social
purposes.
If nonprofits have the prerogative and resources for
consequential decision-making, questions of legitimacy
and accountability arise. Questions of this type have been
posed very sharply in the business world in recent decades,
where the self-interest of corporations is obvious, and the
result has been an exploding worldwide CSR movement.
Less recognized has been the parallel movement in which
nonprofits, as well, are increasingly responding to ques-
tions about the legitimacy of their amplified actorhood. In
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this paper, we have analytically labeled and discussed the
major movements in the evolution of nonprofit responsi-
bility, empirically documented the upward trajectory of
actorhood and responsibility documents among nonprofits,
and compared the incidences of these documents with
businesses.
Our findings point to an organizational responsibility
movement (‘‘OSR’’) that is about organizations in general
rather than particular types, whether businesses, nonprofits,
or bureaucracies. Popular CSR initiatives, indeed, are now
extant that gather together multiple stakeholders to unite
the movement across organizational forms. Apart from the
Global Compact and Global Reporting Initiative, there is
also the ISO 26000 Standards, ISO 14000 standards of
Environmental Management, and the World Economic
Forum, each of which enables all sorts of organizations to
participate in the wider responsibility movement through
processual, certification, or reporting frameworks.
What we have observed in this paper could be called the
‘‘blurring of boundaries’’ between traditional sectors
(Bromley and Meyer 2017) and strongly relates to the
notion of ‘‘organizational hybridity’’ in the nonprofit lit-
erature (Alter 2005; Aoyama and Parthasarathy 2016; Ja¨ger
and Schro¨er 2014; Johanson and Vakkuir 2017). The
hybridity literature has tended to emphasize the cross-fer-
tilization of businesses and nonprofits by logics that have
been previously contained to a single sector, and has
sometimes focused on the blending of these logics at the
level of the organizational form, yielding such new social
arrangements as the Benefit Corporation, social
entrepreneurship, networked governance, public–private
partnerships, and the cause–brand alliance. Much like the
standard approach in the hybridization literature, we have
traced the cross-sectoral spread of organizational logics,
namely, actorhood and social responsibility. More broadly,
our general view is that the emergence of hybrid organi-
zational forms stems from organizational efforts to respond
structurally to the multiple logics at play—including
rationality, efficiency, actorhood, and social responsibility.
Future research could take the ideas in this paper in new
directions. Whereas our Web site content analysis had
binary data to indicate the presence or absence of a
responsibility or actorhood structure, subsequent scholars
could use more sophisticated text processing methods to
analyze the actual content of the documents in question. Do
core values statements, mission statements, and vision
statements include fundamentally different language across
companies and nonprofits? Follow-on studies could also
trace the diffusion or analyze the content of additional
structures of organizational responsibility. Whereas our
study has pertained to only a few example responsibility
structures, there are many more that could be imagined as
having responsibility content, including letters to the
shareholders, annual reports, impact reports, and various
other corporate filings, statements, policies, and by-laws.
Lastly, although our main storyline has been about
isomorphism, our metastudy and secondary content anal-
ysis suggest some persistent cross-sectoral differences in
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the adoption of actorhood and responsibility structures. Our
scatterplots suggested, further, that nonprofits and compa-
nies have been converging upon the structures that we
analyzed, but from different directions, with nonprofits
having had more adoptions of mission and vision state-
ments, and with companies, for example, having had
greater adoptions of statements of core values. Future
researchers might proceed from these findings to theorize
different types of actorhood across sector, rather than
assume that actorhood is a singular construct. Do non-
profits exhibit mostly purposive actorhood—emphasizing
their socially legitimated goals (mission) and their positive
outcomes (vision), whereas companies exhibit mostly au-
tonomous actorhood—emphasizing guidelines rather than
goals, conduct more than ethics, and character more than
consequences? Their greater purposiveness around goals
with high social legitimation might explain why nonprofits
have had a measurably lower participation in structures that
emphasize social responsibility beyond the immediate task
or vision. For companies, the autonomy of their actorhood
toward the abstract, industry-neutral, potentially socially
deleterious objective of profits might explain why they
have devoted so much energy into developing highly
bounded identities that stress the capacity for responsible
decision-making.
In conclusion, the nonprofit is now constructed as a
responsible citizen within a very wide, sometimes global,
social order. The renowned neoliberal hollowing out of the
state has put power in the hands of an expanded organi-
zational system, but has called attention to the expanded
responsibilities involved. As nonprofits increasingly adopt
the posture of organizational actorhood, they increasingly
articulate and stress their missions, but also their confor-
mity to legal (and natural) environments and their respect
for expanded human rights. In addition, there is an
expanded focus on transparency, accountability, and
trustworthiness—and more positively, on values, citizen-
ship, and leadership. Since these forces are rooted in a
neoliberal order shared by all organizations that increas-
ingly operates at the global level, the result has been a
considerable degree of cross-sectoral organizational iso-
morphism: Both nonprofits and companies move toward
the standard model of responsible organizational actor-
hood—a dominant social form in the contemporary world.
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